Iran–U.S. Relations: Imagining
a New Paradigm
PANEL I: Imagining a New Paradigm for U.S.–Iranian Relations
The moderator, Stephen Heintz, opened by reiterating that although the U.S.–Iranian relationship has been characterized by fear, paranoia, and conflict, there are real potential benefits of increased cooperation between the two sides. As someone who has been involved in a six year effort of “track two” dialogue between Iranians and Americans, Heintz affirmed that he shared the vision described by Tlili. He deemed the current U.S. policy of halting Iran’s nuclear program through successive rounds of sanctions a failure. Heintz stressed the need for a fresh approach and emphasized that this would require sober assessment and no illusions about the complex nature of the issue. Heintz identified a set of questions intended to guide the panel discussion:
- Where should U.S.–Iranian relations fit in Obama’s list of priorities?
- Should the U.S. and Iran address contentious issues separately or comprehensively?
- How can Iran’s nuclear program be successfully addressed?
The first panelist was Professor Ervand Abrahamian. Abrahamian said that the last 30 years have been marked by an unwillingness to talk on the part of both sides. Today, for the first time, both sides are interested in meaningful dialogue which has created a sense of optimism. However, three realities will create obstacles to any meaningful discussion if they are not taken into account.
First is the prevalent tendency in the United States to minimize Iranian mistrust of foreign powers. When the Iranian leadership talks about American imperial hubris, this is not just rhetoric. It is a real fear based on Iran’s historical experience over the past 200 years, during which it has been the victim of seven foreign invasions. These experiences have left a deep imprint on how policy–makers and ordinary citizens think about Iran’s future security. Abrahamian stressed the importance of taking Iranian perceptions more seriously during the process of negotiations.
Second is the Iranian leadership’s deep mistrust of the international community, especially after it turned a blind eye to Saddam Hussein’s use of weapons of mass destruction during the Iran–Iraq war. The leadership believes instead that Iran’s national security can be best protected by a strategy of deterrence and self–defense, rather than relying on the good will of the international community and United Nations.
Third is the wrongly–held expectation that Iran should dismantle its entire nuclear program. Most of Iran’s leadership agrees that a nuclear capability is essential to Iran’s future security. Most leaders do not want a weapon at hand, but simply the capability of producing nuclear weapons in the future should the situation warrant such action. The U.S. demand that Iran dismantle their entire program is a non–starter for negotiations because it means, from an Iranian perspective, forfeiting this capability. Most Iranian moderates and pragmatic conservatives would be content simply to have a nuclear capability, but not an actual weapon. This is not a radical position; over 30 other countries also have this capability and they are left alone so long as they do not actually build a bomb.
Without changing these realities, noted Abrahamian, we cannot expect any rapprochement or détente between the United States and Iran.
Abrahamian also suggested that the U.S. rhetoric of regime change hinders the possibility of successful negotiations. It revives memories of the U.S.–backed 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadeq, which still lingers in the Iranian psyche. For Iranians, the U.S. Congress’ recent decision to give $60 million to opponents of the current regime confirms their suspicions of American intentions to interfere in Iranian domestic politics and undermine the Islamic Republic.
Abrahamian also spoke about a rift between Iranian radicals and moderates on how far to pursue their acquisition of a nuclear bomb. Former negotiator Hassan Rouhani and others are aware that the U.S. would not accept a nuclear–armed Iran and that acquisition of the bomb would have serious consequences. Others, like President Ahmedinejad, may be less aware of these dangers. Successful negotiations will depend on these differences being worked out within the Iranian regime.
Back to the top.
Publications
Social, Ethical, Political, and Policy Implications Of Interpretations Of Islam’s Foundational Text: The Qur’an
Report of the symposium organized by the NYU Center for Dialogues: Islamic World–U.S.–The West
Donate Now
How to make a tax-deductible donation to The Center for Dialogues
Donate
