The second panelist, Professor Gary Sick, focused on some practical ways for improving U.S.–Iranian relations in the first 5–10 months of the new Obama administration.
Washington faces a choice, he suggested: to either treat Iran as a permanent enemy or as a normal country with whom cooperation can be mutually beneficial. The current impasse is, in part, psychological and affects how the two countries see each other. Hardliners in both countries play a role in reinforcing negative perceptions of the other side.
In Sick’s assessment, Obama has shown great courage by publicly announcing during his campaign that he is willing to have discussions with Iran. This has allowed politicians and other voices in international affairs to talk about engaging Iran more openly. The result has been a recent spate of studies focusing on diplomatic avenues for dealing with Iran. ( Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World published by the Leadership Group on U.S.–Muslim Engagement* and Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President published by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution are two reports that encourage the Obama administration to immediately engage in dialogue with Iran without preconditions.)
The so–called Iranian threat pales in comparison to other threats, like the global economic meltdown, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Sick noted. These concerns will pre–occupy the Obama administration and may sideline the Iranian issue. On the positive side, polls show that a majority of Iranians would like to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, which should be an encouraging sign for the next administration.
Sick outlined what he sees as an immediate strategy for the new administration. There is an upcoming Iranian presidential election in June, and any U.S. attempt to skew it will backfire. Any U.S. action from now until then will be interpreted with scrutiny in Iran. The time is not right for the United States to propose a set of major new initiatives, and Iran is not in an appropriate position to respond. In the next six months, the United States should send goodwill signals, without any ambitious proposals.
By way of example, Sick listed some gestures the United States could make in the near future. The United States could seek Iran’s cooperation on the U.S.–Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, which stipulates a withdrawal of U.S. forces from major Iraqi towns and cities by June 30, 2009. The United States could engage with Iran over the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in September 2009. The U.S. could also encourage Iraq and Afghanistan to convene a meeting with their neighbors, including Iran, to discuss appropriate security arrangements and the maintenance of regional stability.
Sick also reminded the audience of the still–valid 1981 Algiers Accord, which stipulates that the United States will not intervene in Iranian internal affairs. Reaffirming this treaty could send a positive signal to Iran, especially considering that the U.S. policy of funding NGOs and opposition groups to instigate a “Velvet Revolution” in Iran has been an utter failure. He also insisted that American 501(c)3 organizations should be given license to operate in Iran.
Sick concluded that, depending on how Iran responds to the initial signals outlined above, the United States should prepare a set of initiatives to pursue after the Iranian elections. The United States should not move too hastily, and movement forward must depend on Iranian reciprocity.
* NYU Center for Dialogues’ Director Mustapha Tlili served as a member of the leadership group.
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